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Multiple factors ranging from globalization to ecosystem disruption are presenting the
global community with evolving biological threats to local, national, and global security
that reach beyond the realm of traditional bioweapon threats. As a result, mitigation
strategies have adapted necessarily to the increased diversity of biological threats. In
general, response and preparedness strategies have largely shifted from being primarily
reactive to traditional biological weapons to more proactive in nature. In this review,
we briefly explore biological threats through a wider aperture, to embrace a greater
appreciation of viral pathogens, antimicrobial resistance, and agricultural pathogens, and
their potential to cause civil, economic, and political devastation. In addition, we discuss
current mitigation strategies codified by the Global Health Security Agenda and the One
Health paradigm as well as some of the available tools to assist with their sustainable
implementation.
Keywords: biological threats, mitigation strategies, Global Health Security Agenda, OneHealth, Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, Department of Defense, antimicrobial resistance, biosurveillance
INTRODUCTION
The world has entered a new era of biological threats due to unprecedented changes brought
by globalization, growing agricultural demands, the diffusion of advanced biotechnologies, and
insufficient reporting of outbreaks. Outbreaks of zoonotic diseases for which adequate treat-
ments or vaccinations are unavailable or of diseases that could cripple the agriculture sector are
examples of “non-traditional” biological threats with the potential to cause public health and
economic devastation. Although these threats fall outside the traditional boundaries of bioter-
rorism, they have become a major target of the biodefense community in order to protect U.S.
Armed Forces and citizens at home and abroad as well as our allies. Mitigating these threats
requires the close cooperation of the national security, public health, and agriculture communi-
ties within the United States, partner nations, international organizations, and non-government
organizations.
This article provides an overview of the non-traditional biological threats posed by emerging
viruses, antibiotic-resistant bacteria, and agricultural pathogens. The article then describes efforts by
the government sector [e.g., the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)] and the non-government
sector (e.g., the One Health paradigm) to develop frameworks to address these threats. Finally,
the article offers an assessment of the contribution that the Cooperative Biological Engagement
Program (CBEP)within theDepartment ofDefense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program
has made to global health security through its programs to strengthen biosurveillance (BSV) and
building partner capacity through collaborative research.
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org November 2015 | Volume 3 | Article 2511
Galloway et al. Non-Traditional Biological Threats and Mitigation Strategies
VIRAL THREATS
While viruses are considered traditional biological threats by the
defense and security sectors, they are typically discussed in terms
of bioengineering to increase pathogenicity or “weaponize” rather
than appreciating the threat they pose naturally. In this regard,
an understanding of the health care system, cultural practices of
the affected population, and political and economic climate of
the affected region are critical and often underestimated aspects
of dealing with viral outbreaks. Even when these factors are
understood, the capabilities of governments and non-government
organizations to respond effectively are complex and legitimate.
There are a number of viral threats to public health as well as
regional, national, and global health security. However, the over-
whelming majority of viruses on the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention and the United States Department of Agriculture
“Select Agents” lists are RNA viruses, which are among the most
serious uncontrolled causes of extant and emerging infectious
diseases (1, 2). Owing to the nature of their replicationmachinery,
which lacks proofreading activity and therefore has high error
rates, RNAviruses exist as quasi-species or a “molecular swarm” of
viral genomes. This leads to each having different levels of fitness
within the population and positioned to respond readily to selec-
tive pressure (3–5). This feature affords RNA virus populations
the capability to evolve at rates of up to one million times faster
than their DNA counterparts, presenting a daunting public health
challengewhendesigning therapeutics and vaccines. This is exem-
plified by the antiviral resistance in HIV and influenza virus pop-
ulations, as well as the evolution of influenzaA virus, which neces-
sitates the annual reformulation of the vaccine. Other more genet-
ically stable viruses, such as the DNA virus causing smallpox, have
also been considered traditional biological threats. However, due
to the availability of an effective vaccine, the success of the erad-
ication campaigns over the last 45 years, and the consolidation of
virus stocks, smallpox is generally disregarded as a public health
threat. It has been speculated that due to the cessation of mass
vaccination in 1980 and waning immunity, less than 20% of the
population is sufficiently protected from infection (6). As such, the
result of an outbreak of smallpox, either accidental or intentional,
could be devastating to a regional, national, or global population.
The recent Ebola virus (an RNA virus that causes hemorrhagic
fever) epidemic inWest Africa highlights the civil, economic, and
public health system destabilization that can occur as the result of
a naturally occurring epidemic, let alone an intentional outbreak.
For example, the epidemic has resulted in over 27,000 reported
cases and more than 11,000 deaths, with an economic impact
on Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia rising to approximately
5% of their combined GDP in 2014 and 12% in 2015 (7). This
outbreak, along with the potential for other similar catastrophic
events, illustrates that having effective global BSV capabilities and
response plans in place are crucial in mitigating viral pathogen
threats.
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE
Antimicrobial resistance is appreciated in the public health arena
as an emerging threat, but is only beginning to be explored in
the biological defense sector. The threat of especially dangerous
pathogens, which have either naturally or through genetic engi-
neering acquired resistance to vaccines or antimicrobials, is severe
(8). Genes conferring resistance can be carried on mobile genetic
elements (e.g., plasmids), which can be inconspicuously main-
tained in less concerning bacterial species and transferred through
natural mechanisms to pathogenic agents (9). This is illustrated by
a natural plague outbreak in Madagascar (1995), where a patient
was infected with a plague isolate that was resistant to strepto-
mycin, chloramphenicol, tetracycline, sulfonamides, ampicillin,
kanamycin, and spectinomycin, all of which are first- and second-
line drugs used to treat and prevent plague (10). Further investiga-
tion revealed that the genes for this alarming pattern of resistance
were carried on a plasmid originating in the Enterobacteriaceae
family, which was able to be transferred from Escherichia coli
to the plague bacterium. This demonstrates the real possibility
of dangerous pathogens obtaining antimicrobial resistance genes
from innocuous bacteria in the environment. This evolving threat
has received highest attention with the issuance of Executive
Order 13676: “Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria” by Pres-
ident Barack Obama in September 2014 (11) and a corresponding
“National Action Plan for Combating Antibiotic-resistant Bacte-
ria” released in March 2015 (12).
AGRICULTURAL PATHOGENS
Despite the agriculture sector playing a formidable role in the eco-
nomic, social, and political stability of the U.S., it has yet to receive
the needed attention with respect to protection against major
biological threats. Unlike the developing world, if a devastating
outbreak of either animal or plant disease occurred in the U.S.
(e.g., African swine fever, soybean rust, and potato wart), it would
be the severe economic consequences that would pose as the
greatest threat, not famine (13). A powerful example is the case of
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom
(2001), a country previously free of the disease. FMD is a viral
disease that affects cloven-hoofed animals, and while it is a disease
of low mortality, it is highly infectious and spreads via aerosols or
direct contact with contaminated equipment or feed. Following
the first outbreak, the European Union blocked imports of British
beef, sheep, and swine, leading to an unprecedented loss of rev-
enue of approximately $13 billion and the culling of approximately
10million cattle and sheep. For the U.S., annual sales of beef are
in the realm of $40 billion, illustrating that the trade consequences
of an FMD outbreak could be just as devastating. Surprisingly, the
impact in countries deemed FMD-free has received more atten-
tion than the impact of outbreaks in FMD-endemic countries,
despite the annual impact of FMD-related losses, estimated to
be up to $21 billion. As with public health threats, mitigation of
agriculture threats face many of the same obstacles and requires
a well-coordinated, timely, and robust animal disease-reporting
system. In addition, worldwide control of agricultural pathogens
requires coordination within and between countries requiring
both national and international public investment.
It is clear from the global spread and economic destruction of
infectious diseases such as Ebola and FMD and the emergence of
antimicrobial resistance pathogens that a new approach to combat
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global biological threats is required. Increased globalization of
trade and travel has resulted in an international community that is
not secure from biological threats. Importantly, more than 80% of
countries did not meet the World Health Organization deadline
for being prepared for infectious disease threats. Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 is a primary example of
this. In under a year, SARS swept 29 countries, was diagnosed in
over 8000 patients, and led to 774 deaths (14). The rapid spread of
SARS was made possible by the unprecedented volume and speed
of international travel and the inability of countries to handle the
detection, diagnosis, and reporting of the disease.
GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA
To tackle such issues, the GHSA, a new multisectoral and inter-
agency government approach to combat global threats, was
launched by the U.S. and international partners in 2014. The
major objectives of the GHSA are to prevent avoidable epidemics,
detect threats early, and respond rapidly and effectively on a global
scale. Incidents such as the SARS outbreak highlight that one
nation cannot achieve global health security on its own. As such,
the U.S. has committed to working with 30 countries over the
next 5 years to implement the GHSA. This strategic approach is
aimed to specifically strengthen disease response capabilities and
rapidly detect and improve transparency in outbreak reporting by
supporting existing agreements under the World Health Orga-
nization International Health Regulations 2005 (15), the World
Organization for Animal Health Codes (16), and the Codex Ali-
mentarius International Food Standards (17). In short, the GHSA
is a collaborative effort to secure the world from global health
threats posed by infectious diseases, whether naturally occurring,
or the result of an accidental or intentional release of pathogens.
ONE HEALTH
Estimates indicate that approximately 75% of emerging or
reemerging infections are vector-borne or zoonotic. Within the
last 20 years, there have been several major instances of cross-
species transmission that have caused severe public health, eco-
nomic, and political consequences, not to mention effects on
public confidence in the ability of governments to respond to
emerging biological threats. Examples include the transmission of
H5N1 to humans that was first reported in 1997 (18, 19); theWest
Nile virus outbreak in 1999 that possibly originated from illicit
animal importation into New York (20); the SARS coronavirus
(CoV) epidemic in 2003 originating from bats and/or civets (21,
22); the H1N1 influenza A virus pandemic of 2009 originating
from swine (23); the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome CoV
epidemic in 2012 that likely originated from bats and/or camels
(24, 25); the transmission of H7N9 IAV to humans in 2013 from
poultry (26); and the most recent Ebola virus epidemic in 2014
that was likely transmitted to humans by bats. These examples
underscore how devastating zoonotic diseases can be, even if
rapidly, detected and geographically contained.
The concept of “One Health” is not new, as practitioners
have long recognized the connection between animal and human
disease, but it has achieved greater traction among the human
and animal public health sectors in recent years. The American
Veterinary Medical Association defines One Health, in broad
terms, as “the collaborative effort ofmultiple disciplines –working
locally, nationally, and globally – to attain optimal health for
people, animals and the environment.”(27). Achieving this goal is
articulated by the One Health Initiative that includes several joint
efforts in: (1) the education of stakeholders; (2) communication
in journals, conferences, and health networks; (3) clinical care
through assessment, treatment, and prevention of cross-species
transmission; (4) implementing disease surveillance systems;
(5) achieving a better understanding of factors contributing to
zoonotic transmission; (6) the development and evaluation of new
diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines; and (7) the education of
leaders and the public sector through responsible journalism (28).
There are undeniable benefits to operating under the One
Health umbrella, but consideration of unintentional conse-
quences is worth noting. For example, how should the economic
implications of reporting outbreaks in animal populations balance
against public health? Are theremechanisms in place to reduce the
severity of disruptions to a fledgling economy to bolster reporting
levels? Regardless of the barriers, what is clear is that achieving the
vision of theOneHealth Initiative will require substantial and sus-
tained international commitment in terms of funding, research,
public and animal health capacity building, and infrastructure
development.
THE COOPERATIVE THREAT
REDUCTION PROGRAM
The CTR Program has evolved from the original Nunn-Lugar
CTR program, which focused on materials and expertise left
behind by the Soviet regime, into a comprehensive program to
reduce worldwide threats from nuclear, radiological, chemical,
and biological weapons. A central tenet of the CTR Program is
sustainability, as the ultimate vision is that partner countries have
the appropriate facilities that incorporate safety and security stan-
dards, necessary training, and technical expertise to effectively
mitigate nuclear, chemical, and biological threats within their
borders.
WithinCTR, CBEP engages with partner country governments,
institutions, and scientists to reduce the threat from traditional
biowarfare agents, as well as agents that do not have a history of
attempted weaponization, but are of security concern due to their
potential to cause mortality, economic, or civil disruption. As the
nature of biological threats evolves, CBEP has demonstrated the
flexibility and agility to address the challenge, by encouraging the
safe and secure development of biological research and scientific
workforce capacity. Below, we focus on two major mechanisms
for accomplishing the CTRmission: biosurveillance, which inher-
ently incorporates biosafety and biosecurity elements, and the
Cooperative Biological Research (CBR) program within CBEP.
BIOSURVEILLANCE
Biosurveillance refers to the continual process of gathering, ana-
lyzing, and interpreting data in order to achieve early detection,
warning, and awareness of biological threats to human or ani-
mal health as well as to national, regional, and global security.
BSV capability requires trained epidemiologists and clinicians,
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laboratory capability to diagnose disease, and information sys-
tems to manage and relay disease information to decision makers
responsible formanaging outbreak responses. The foundation of a
functioning BSV system is a capable network of local laboratories
that serve as spokes to a central reference laboratory for diagnostic
and reporting purposes. Together with host governments, the U.S.
interagency, and non-government organizations, CBEP improves
capabilities that support sustainable and integrated laboratory
networks in partner countries. Notable benefits of engaging part-
ner countries on BSV-related efforts are the overall safety and
security culture that may be imparted on professionals in the BSV
network and by investing in coordinated surveillance of human,
animal, and plant health, not only does overall health improve,
but practitioners have an increased ability to detect outbreaks of
pathogens of security concern, which may lead to more timely
implementation of mitigation strategies.
Cooperative Biological Engagement Program employs several
core strategies in working with a partner country to enhance
BSV capacity and capability, including building secure laboratory
infrastructure and identifying and training laboratory personnel
and clinicians to conduct safe and secure diagnostics, especially
when working with dangerous and highly infectious pathogens.
CBEP also supports the implementation of BSV-based research to
monitor endemic diseases in order to differentiate between nat-
ural, accidental, and deliberate outbreaks, as well as information
system networks tomanage health-related data, critical to BSV, for
the purpose of analysis and reporting to the authorities responsi-
ble for implementing specific biological mitigation strategies.
The implementation of a BSV system can be complicated; there
is no universal solution, andmultiple factors should be considered
in order to strike the appropriate balance between specificity
and sensitivity. These include the cost of implementation, most
effective type of BSV that should be implemented for a given
country or disease (active vs. passive and syndromic vs. laboratory
surveillance), most effective information and analysis system to
use, laboratory capabilities of the country, and extent of known
biological markers of disease. The assessment of these factors
requires a collaborative and interdisciplinary approach ranging
from engagement with public and animal health practitioners
to coordination with government officials and law enforcement.
Considering the gamut of collaboration, CBEP is uniquely posi-
tioned to affect a multitude of capabilities that ultimately lead to
improved local, national, and global health security.
COOPERATIVE BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
As illustrated by the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, a naturally
occurring outbreak can quickly become a transcontinental
threat, the mitigation of which requires a modern approach.
This includes building networks of professionals trained in the
safe and secure conduct of biological research and surveillance.
CBEP’s CBR funds collaborative projects with researchers from
partner countries. The projects include elements of biosafety
and biosecurity training, and the research topics are strategic,
furthering the interests of the partner countries as well as the
objectives of CBEP. These efforts contribute to global BSV of
human and animal pathogens endemic in partner countries,
providing a baseline prevalence of biological disease threats
within a geographic area. Understanding the incidence and
natural variations of pathogens in an ecosystem is crucial to the
investigation of an unusual outbreak and to the public, animal,
and/or plant health response. These data help to determine the
source of an outbreak as well as make a rapid determination
of whether an increase in infections or antimicrobial resistance
is natural or due to an accidental or intentional release. The
cooperative nature of the CBR program provides a platform
for the international collaborative work necessary to address
transboundary threats such as zoonotic diseases carried across
borders by infected humans, importation of animals, or natural
movement of mobile vectors such as bats. These diseases require
a comprehensive One Health approach involving both human
and animal health sectors, which CBR facilitates.
Moreover, the scientific collaboration encouraged by the CBR
program is an example of the diplomacy and engagement that
fosters continued communication networks among the interna-
tional community that are crucial during outbreaks of pathogens.
The language of science is universal, and the value of interna-
tional collaboration is clear to those engaged in scientific research.
Scientists welcome shared information regarding data, protocols,
equipment, and training, and interactions of this nature are excel-
lent starting points for U.S. engagement, as well as collaboration
among partner countries, facilitating peaceful collaboration and
free exchange of information.
CONCLUSION
The world is constantly changing: humans across the globe are
more interconnected and, due to habitat encroachment and eco-
logical shifts, are in closer and more frequent contact with animal
reservoirs of disease than ever before. This combined with free
information flow, rapid scientific development, and the ever-
present potential of misuse of biological agents presents a new and
challenging environment for biological threat reduction requiring
an adapted strategic approach. Open, effective, and consistent
international collaboration for surveillance of pathogens is a back-
bone of this new approach. It must be comprehensive and include
emerging threat agents, which are not necessarily limited to the
traditional bioweapon agents of the Cold War era. Safe, secure,
and sustainable capacity development in partner countries to
increase the network of trained biological science professionals,
as well as interconnected and effective infrastructure, is neces-
sary. CBEP combines international agility and experiences with
cutting-edge technical expertise to not only effectively reduce the
threat from “traditional” bio-warfare agents but also emerging
biological threats.
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